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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RANCH HOMES, INC. ,
PlaintiffRespondent,
Case No. 15467

vs.
GREATER PARK CITY
CORPORATION,
DefendantAppellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Ranch Homes, brought this action for damages
for breach of an option agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The first trial was by jury, which found against the
defendant, Greater Park City Company.

Greater Park City

Company thereupon promptly made a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and, alternatively, for a New Trial.

The

Honorable Peter F. Leary granted Greater Park City Company's
Motion for a New Trial.

The new trial was had, without a

jury, before the Honorable James

s.

Sawaya.

At the conclusion

of the second trial, the Court entered judgment against Greater
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Park City Company in the sum of $42,587.00, together with
prejudgment interest in the amount of $6,196.12 and costs
in the amount of $655.30.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Greater Park City Company seeks reversal of the
judgment or, alternatively, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ranch Homes is a corporation formed in the summer of
1974.

(Transcript of First Trial, Volume 1, page 21, herein-

after 1st Tr., 1 at 21; Transcript of Second Trial, page 24,
hereinafter 2d Tr. at 24).

James Fahs is plaintiff's presider.:

and Grant Kesler and Michael Tuckett are vice-presidents.

(ls'

Tr., 1 at 21 & 43).
On September 3, 1974, Ranch Homes entered into an
Option Agreement with Greater Park City Company to purchase
approximately 30 acres of undeveloped property in Park City,
Utah.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 -- unless otherwise noted, all

exhibits referred to will be those introduced in the second
trial and found at Record on Appeal, page 192, hereinafter
R.192).

The consideration paid by Ranch Homes for the option

was $10,000.

(See paragraph 1 of plaintiff's Exhibit 2) ·

Paragraph 2 of the Option Agreement provided that the option
period was to expire at 5:00 p.m. on April 1, 1975.

If Ranch

Homes elected to exercise the option, it was to give written
notice of such election to Greater Park City Company on or

-2-
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--before April 1, 1975.

(Paragraph 3).

The Option Agreement contained two purchase prices:
$480,000 if paid in cash on or before the closing date; or,
at Ranch Homes' election, $510,000 payable in installments
of $50,000 on or before the closing date and $150,000 plus
interest on April 1st of 1976, 1977, and 1978.

(Paragraph 5).

Ranch Homes elected the installment payment method
(plaintiff's Exhibit 1), but did not appear on the closing
date to tender the first $50,000 payment.
2d Tr. at 202).

(1st Tr., 1 at 70;

The property subsequently passed into the

hands of defendant's principal creditor, a third party.
(1st Tr., 2 at 107; 2d Tr. at 202).
Throughout most of both trials, Ranch Homes expressed
its intent to use the property for an FHA-insured, singlefamily housing development.
25).

(1st Tr., 1 at 33-35; 2d Tr. at

The first phase of the proposed development would have

entailed the construction of 32 homes, with a sales price in
the range of $54,000 to.$55,000.
265).

(1st Tr., 1 at 50; 2d Tr. at

The houses would be constructed in a "cluster" around

cul-de-sacs.

(1st Tr., 1 at 37 & 39; 2d Tr. at 29).

At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury
answered a Special Verdict, in which it found that Greater
Park City Company had repudiated or breached the Option Agreement, and that Ranch Hornes was thereby excused from tendering
$50,000 on the closing date.

(R. 91).

similar findings and conclusions.

Judge Sawaya made

(R.163).

Greater Park City
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Company does not contesL these findings on appeal.
Rather, what Greater Park City Company does dispute is the
amount of damages awarded to Ranch Homes and the methods by
which the damages were computed.
Judge Sawaya found (Finding No. 13, R.166) that
between September 3, 1974, and April 30, 1975, Ranch Homes,
in reasonable reliance upon the Option Agreement, expended
the sum of $27,587.00, and through its officers performed
services of a value of $15, 000. 00, in preparation for performance of the contract, in part performance of the contract,
and in planning for the development of the optioned property.
These expenditures and services, the Judge found, were of the
type contemplated by the contract and were foreseeable by the
parties at the time the contract was executed.

Id.

Interest

and costs were added to these reliance damages in the judgment.
(See R.168).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
PLAINTIFF'S EXPENDITURES WERE NOT REASONABLY MADE
IN PERFORMANCE OF THE OPTION AGREEMENT OR NECESSARY
PREPARATION THEREOF, AND GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY
DID NOT HAVE REASON TO FORESEE THEM AS A PROBABLE
RESULT OF ANY BREACH WHEN THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS MADE.
Damages for breach of contract are awarded only ~~:
"[T]he defendant had reason to foresee [those
injuries] as a probable result of his breach
when the contract was made.
If the injury is
one that follows the breach in the usual course
of events, there is sufficient reason for the

-4-
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defendant to foresee it; otherwise, it must
be shown specifically that the defendant had
reason to know the facts and to foresee the
Tnjury."
(Emphasis added).
Restatement of Contracts § 330.
cf. pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident &
_!Edemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1938).

Also,

before reliance damages may be awarded, the amount of plaintiff's expenditures must be found to have been "reasonably
made."

Restatement of Contracts § 333.

If the plaintiff's

expenditures are unreasonable and unnecessary for the purpose
of carrying out the contract, then they must not be allowed.
See United States v. Behan, 11-0 U.S. 338 (1883).
To sustain the trial court's finding, this Court must
concur that the following expenditures, among others, were both
foreseeable by defendant at the time the Option Agreement was
executed and that they were reasonably made:
1.

Expenditures incurred prior to the

execution of the Option Agreement on September 3,
1974.
2.

Expenditures incurred prior to plaintiff's

exercise of the Option on April 1, 1975.
3.

Expenditures incurred in designing the

housing development in an extraordinary manner
with "cluster" housing at the end of cul-de-sac
streets, and with unusual planting islands in··
the middle of each cul-de-sac.
4.

Expenditures incurred in the form of
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services performed by plaintiff's officers in
attempting to obtain loans for the development,
and in pursuing FHA financing where conventional
financing would allow lower down payments by
potential buyers.
5.

Expenditures incurred during the option

period in the form of services performed by
one of plaintiff's officers in drafting
architectural plans for the proposed houses,
rather than plaintiff's purchasing plans from
a design firm for many thousands of dollars less.
6.

Expenditures incurred during the option

period in the form of services performed by one
of plaintiff's officers in preparing completed
engineering plans where a simple preliminary
plot would have sufficed.
7.

Expenditures incurred by plaintiff for

logo and brochure design.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit

5, Check No. 116).
8.

Expenditures incurred in the incorpora-

tion of plaintiff and in the drafting of a prior
limited partnership agreement.
9.

Expenditures incurred in the drafting

of final architectural and engineering plans
for all phases of development notwithstanding
the fact that only Phase I was to be completed
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in ]975, and incurred before exercising the
option, before receiving FHA approval and before
a construction loan was approved.
10.

Expenditures incurred for all of the

above items even though, as plaintiff finally
testified at the conclusion of the Second Trial,
a purchaser could have bought a lot from plaintiff
and built his own house upon it without using
plaintiff's plans!
It is respectfully submitted that these items of
damage charged to defendant were neither foreseeable nor
reasonable.

As the uncontroverted testimony of defendant's

expert witness, Mr. Herbert Trayner, a subdivider and
licensed general contractor, established, the industry standard for the steps to be taken by a reasonably prudent
developer after obtaining an option but before exercising it
are as follows:
First, a' developer must assure himself that the property
can be rezoned if it is not already zoned for the intended use.
(2d Tr. at 302-303).

The developer must indicate to the zoning

authority who owns the property, the number of units per acre
which will be constructed upon it, and whether it is going to
be single-family, commercial or whatever.

(2d Tr. at 303).

To effect a zoning change, if it can be done, takes an· average
of between six to eight weeks.

The developer's expenditure of

~ consists of "a little leg work."

(2d Tr. at 306, 316).
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In talking with the zoning board, it is helpful to
have a preliminary plat showing the configuration of the
use to which the developer intends to put the land.

!".o other
----------.:

renderings, working drawings, architectural or engineering
plans are needed until after the option is exercised.

If

a developer has a good working relationship with an engineeri:·
firm, they will do a preliminary plat without charge.

Ot~~

wise, i t will cost around $500.

Also,

(2d Tr. at 303-304).

with a preliminary plat, a developer can get a reasonably
strong commitment from a lender assuming that he can get the
zoning he is looking for.

There is no need for architectural

drawings or completed engineering plans to talk to lenders
during the option period.

"That's just too much expense to

get into at this point."

(2d Tr. at 306-307, emphasis suppliE:

During the option period, a developer should also
talk to subcontractors to get a preliminary estimate of costs.
Estimates for off-site improvements can be based on the
preliminary plat.

( 2d Tr. at 3 0 6) •

For the houses themselves,

hiring an architect is just too exoensive.

Design firms sell

housing plans that are current on styles, cost and desirabili:
Each plan includes six sets of prints, enough to get bids and
to build the homes.
house.

Each plan costs from $100 to $400 per

Many developers can even avoid this expense since

they have their own plan files.

(2d Tr. at 307-309).

If a developer decides to qualify for FHA financing,
his only need is to get a verbal understanding that FHA

-8-
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be

interested in underwriting the houses at a certain price

range.

During the option period it is premature to submit

any plans to them.

(2d Tr. at 315-316).

The FHA will work

with a developer on a very preliminary basis since they do
not want him to spend any more money than is necessary.
(2d Tr. at 325).
The key, therefore, is to keep expenditures to a
minimum during the option period.

As Mr. Trayner testified:

"With the exception of whatever charge the
engineer may have to work a -- work out a
preliminary plat and unless the community
would require some sort of a filing fee,
there shouldn't have to be any costs."
(2d Tr. at 316).
In contrast to the standards of the industry, plaintiff's
damages included the following unforeseeable and unreasonable
expenditures incurred by plaintiff during the option and,
therefore, prior to the time plaintiff had committed to purchase
the property.

Plaintiff's vice-president and attorney, Grant

Kesler, was paid a lump sum of $2,500 for all legal services
rendered.

(1st Tr., 1 at 91-92; 2d Tr. at 121-122 & 127-128;

plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Check No. 110).

This expenditure,

however, included services rendered in the organization and
formation of the plaintiff, which occurred prior to the execution
of the Option Agreement.

(2d Tr. at 121 & 128).

Ranch Homes

was first organized by Mr. Kesler as a limited partnership and,
after some tax advice, it was changed to a Subchapter "S"
corporation.

Mr. Kesler's services not only included the
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drafting of the corporate Articles, By-laws, Minutes, and
stock certificates, but also the negotiation and drafting of
the Option Agreement itself.

(2d Tr. at 72

&

It

121-122).

is respectfully submitted that Greater Park City Company
could not foresee damages relating to the formation of plaintiff and the execution of the Option Agreement.
Plaintiff paid $5,000 to its president, Mr. Fahs, for
drafting final architectural plans.

(1st Tr., 1 at 54

&

66;

2d Tr. at 33; plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Check Nos. 102, 105, 107
&

111).

Plaintiff expended another $5, 000 in payment to its

vice-president, Mr. Tuckett, a licensed engineer, for his
"managerial" services which included meeting with the FHA and
the Park City Engineer to coordinate all drawings and
work.

{1st Tr., 1 at 74-75

&

desi~

86; 2d Tr. at 110; plaintiff's

Exhibit 5, Check Nos. 103, 106, 109, 114 & 115).
expenditures were charged to defendant.

Both

the~

In addition, plain-

tiff claimed to have been damaged in the amount of $17,500
for Mr. Fahs' "quarterbacking" services.

Mr. Fahs was involve'

in the negotiation of the Option Agreement, working with the
Park City Master Plan Committee and Planning Commission to
rezone the property and to get a , )roval for their "cluster"
concept of housing, and in meeting with the various lenders
and with FHA.

(1st Tr., 1 at 37-39 and 2 at 33; 2d Tr. at 60i

.Mr. Fahs testified that he spent seven months full time on the
project, that if he had been working for a developer in Salt
.
Lake, he would have been earning
$30,000 a year, an d ' therefoti
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his seven-month salary would equate to $17,500.

33-34; 2d Tr. at 60-61) ·
~

(1st Tr., 2 at

Also, plaintiff claimed $22,750 for

engineering plans drawn by Mr. Tuckett.

The engineering

plans, of course, conformed to the nature of the architectural
plans in the platting of the property and designing the roads,
sewer system, and water and drainage systems for "cluster"
housing on cul-de-sac streets.

(See plaintiff's Exhibits 14

and 15; 1st Tr., 1 at 76; cf. 2d Tr. at 109).

The Trial Judge

awarded $15,000 for Mr. Tuckett's engineering and Mr. Fahs'
•quarterbacking" services.

Plaintiff's expenditures for the

services performed by Mr. Fahs and Mr. Tuckett suffer from
numerous defects.
Some of the work these two individuals performed was
rendered before the Option Agreement was executed.
at 70).

(2d Tr.

Plaintiff failed in its proof to distinguish between

services rendered before and after execution.
60, 70, 73

&

8.6).

(See 2d Tr. at

Also, all but a very small portion of the

damages awarded plaintiff were for expenditures made and
services performed before plaintiff exercised its option.
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 5).

Can it be said that it is both

foreseeable and reasonable that plaintiff would prepare final
architectural and engineering plans before a construction loan
was granted and before plaintiff purchased the property?

Can

it also be said that it is both foreseeable and reasonable
that plaintiff would prepare architectural plans at all, rather
than using a design firm?
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Can it be said that it was both foreseeable ana
reasonable for plaintiff to continue in its attempt to
secure an FHA commitment when the sales price on its homes
was $55,000?

As the testimony of defendant's expert

·

w1 tness,

Mr. Gordon Hashimoto, Assistant Professor of Architecture at
the University of Utah, established, it was not prudent to
have FHA financing for houses selling in this price range.

(2d Tr. at 247-248).

Since the FHA loan limit at the ti~

was $45,000, a $55,000 house would require a $10,000 down
payment, or 18% of the purchase price.

Conventional financin:

(without FHA) would have made lower down payments available
for buyers.

(Id.).

Mr. Trayner concurred in this conclusion

and added that a prudent developer should get just a verbal
understanding from the FHA during the option period.
at 315-316).

(2d Tr.

The FHA will work with a developer on a

preliminary basis; there is no need to spend a lot of money
(2d Tr. at 325).

or time in working with them.

Plaintiff's choice of "cluster" housing at the end of
cul-de-sac streets with planting islands in the middle of eac
cul-de-sac, rather than conventional single-family housing,
necessitated additional expenditures which were awarded again
defendant.

Plaintiff's own witnesses testified that the extr

designed into the proposed subdivision, such as circular
planters in the center of cul-de-sac streets, "made the ~ 5 ~
more difficult on this project"

(1st Tr., 1 at 104), and "toe

a great deal more engineering."

(2d Tr. at 31 ) .
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P laintiff

also "had the hardest ti~e in the world tryinq to convince"
the FHA and the zoning board to accept this design.
at 29, 31 & 76).

(Id.).

(2d Tr.

It was something very foreign to them.

Can it be said that it is both foreseeable and

reasonable that plaintiff would spend substantial sums of
money in designing such unusual and difficult features into
its proposed subdivision before actually purchasing the
property?

As Professor Hashimoto testified, cluster housing

is really an alternative to urban housing, not to the type
of suburban housing the plaintiff was proposing.

Its design

was not appropriate at plaintiff's particular site.
at 233-235).

(2d Tr.

In any event, the question here is whether

such expenditures could be reasonably anticipated as damages
flowing from the breach by the defendant of the Option Agreement.
As Mr. Trayner testified, it does not take full time
work for seven months to get financing, zoning and FHA
approvals.

(2d Tr. at 316).

In light of Mr. Trayner's

testimony, can it be said to be both foreseeable and reasonable that Mr. Tucket would spend $5,000 of his time and
Mr. Fahs $17,500 of his time in dealing with these groups?
Also, as Mr. Trayner testified, a developer needs only a
preliminary plot, not final engineering plans, to talk to
zoning boards and lenders.
315-316).

(2d Tr. at 303-304, 306-307 &

Can it then be said to be both foreseeable and

reasonable that Mr. Tuckett would spend $22,750 of his time
in preparing such plans prior to obtaining a zoning change,

-13-
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exercising the option, and purchasing the property?
The most substantial problem, however, that plaintif;
has with its claimed expenditures relates to a startling
admission made at the close of the seco'ld trial.

'rhroughout

the first and almost all of the second trial, plaintiff
maintained that its intent was to build homes.

In the first

trial, Mr. Fahs, plaintiff's president, testified as follows:
"QUESTION: Now, was it
to develop the property
lots, building lots, or
to build homes on these
them?

Ranch Homes' intent
and sell vacant
was it their intent
properties and sell

ANSWER:
It was Ranch Homes' intent to build
homes. We didn't feel that the market in
Park City--there were plenty of lots on the
market.
The idea was to try to sell an FHA
approved $50,000 home with $45,000 financing
at a good interest rate with a very low down
payment and actually get people who were
servicing the resort operation, provide them
with a place to live."
(1st Tr., 3 at 13).
(Accord 2d Tr. at 77, 271-272).

At the conclusion of the

second trial, Mr. Fahs contradicted all of his prior testirnon
in the following dialogue:
"QUESTION: Did you have the idea that you
would sell individual lots without building
the homes on them?
ANSWER:
Yes, I believe my proforma that
was prepared in the Summer of 1974 reflected
that fact.

* * *
QUESTION: Then Mr. Fahs on this Exhibit 9
[plaintiff's master plan prepared by llr. Fahs]
are you telling me the buyer of this lot would
use your plan or wouldn't?
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ANSWER:
He would -- he could use my plan.
If he didn't use my plan, he could use his
own plan.

* * *
QUESTION:
I see.
So then you would have
been willing to just sell thirty-two lots
and not build houses?
ANSWER:
that as

Oh, I think we -- we -- we had
in the back of our minds

(2d Tr. at 387-390).
(~,defendant's

Exhibit 25).

It is respectfully submitted

that neither the architectural or engineering plans, nor
any of the management services performed by either Mr. Fahs
or Mr. Tuckett, were foreseeable or reasonable in light of
Mr. Fahs' amazing testimony that a buyer could have purchased
just a lot from plaintiff and built his own house upon it.
A prospective purchaser did not have to use plaintiff's plans
at all!
In similar situations, the courts have denied claims
of reliance damages.

In the case of Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County

of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 87 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1970), the
appellant sued, inter alia, for $14,237.33 interest paid on
loans which it had obtained to fund the initial development of
its business venture.
special damage.

The trial court excluded this item of

In affirming, the Court of Appeals stated:

"[G)eneral damages are ordinarily confined
to those which would naturally arise from
the breach, or which might have been reasonably contemplated or foreseen by both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach. Second, if

-15-
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special circumstances cause some unusual
injury, special damages are not recoverable
therefor unless the circumstances were
known or should have been known to the
guilty party at the time he entered into
the contract. The requirement of knowledge
or notice as a prerequisite to the recovery
of special damages is based on the theory
that a party does not and cannot assume
limitless responsibility for all consequences
of a breach, and that at the time of contracting he must be advised of the facts
concerning special harm which might result
therefrom, in order that he may determine
whether or not to accept the risk of
contracting."
[italics in original]
Id. at 744.
In Sitlington v. Fulton, 281 F. 2d 552 (10th Cir. 1960)
the plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant for
sale of a farm.

t~

Conveyance of that farm was delayed because

defendant's tenant refused to vacate the premises without a
court order.

In denying plaintiff's claim for cattle losses

and related expenses, the Tenth Circuit stated:
"Special damages could not be recovered
unless in contemplation of the parties at
the time the contract was executed.
The
sellers could not have foreseen that the
purchaser would buy cattle or incur expenses
in planting crops and making improvements
on the farm before obtaining complete
possession."
Id. at 556.
. made was in full awarenes'

Accord, "whatever expenditure

of the contingencies to be met before defendants would come
Corporation Nine v. T~

into ownership of the land

30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973).
The courts are also clear that expenditures made befori
a contract is entered into may not be recovered.

Cacavas v.

-16-
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.

~,

43 Mich. App. 222, 203 N.W.2d 913

(1972)

(expenses

incurred before a contract is made are not in the contemplation of the parties); 17 A.L.R.2d, infra at 1314 ("For
expenditures incurred before the actual making of the
contract, a defendant is not liable unless he is affirmatively
shown to have assumed responsibility for them.

The action is

based upon the contract and can include only losses sustained
as a consequence of it.") •
Reliance damages are not recoverable where the
expenditures are made in a collateral undertaking (such as
the development of plaintiff's proposed subdivision) rather
than in performance of the agreement sued upon (plaintiff's
option to purchase certain land).

See Mendoyoma, supra;

Schnierow v. Boutagy, 33 Cal. App. 336, 164 P. 1132 (1917)
(not foreseeable that a purchaser of real property, in
reliance upon his contract, would sell his own property at
a sacrifice); Susiv. Simonds, 147 Me.. 189, 85 A.2d 178
(1951)

("It must affirmatively appear that the special

circumstances

were communicated by the plaintiff to

the defendant

at the time of making the contract.");

Scheer v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 821, 205 N.W. 250 (1925)

(where

the expenses of procuring a loan to secure conveyance were
held too remote because such expenses arose out of a
collateral transaction); Chamberlain v. Brady, 17 Jones &
Spencer 484, 49 N.Y. Superior Ct. Reports 484
~f'd without opinion,

(1882 N.Y.),

94 N.Y. 649 (costs of architect's
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plans in preparing to build on land held not foreseeable);
17 A.L.R.2d 1300, 1308-1313, Anno:

"Right to recover, in

action for breach of contract, expenditures incurred in
preparation for performance"; 11 Williston on Contracts
§

1363A (3d ed.)

(expenditures are not recoverable unless

they "should properly have been anticipated as necessary
for the performance of the contract and are peculiarly
appropriate for that purpose, rather than for the plaintiff's
general business"); cf. St. Clair v. Local Union No. 515,
422 F.2d 128

(6th Cir. 1969)

(in an action against a union

for unfairly representing plaintiff after his dismissal
from a job, damages for humiliation and embarrassment and
for loss of his home to the mortgage holder were held not
foreseeable) .
In the instant case, not only were plaintiff's
expenditures unforeseeable, but they also related to collatera.
transactions

plaintiff's incorporation and the development

of its proposed subdivision.

Plaintiff's recovery should

be set aside since its expenditures were completely within
its discretion and control, were not in performance of the
Option Agreement, but rather in preparation for its collateral
transactions of incorporation and developing a subdivis~n,
were within the risks it assumed, and were made prior to the
time plaintiff would come into ownership of the property.
The ~arties' Option Agreement did not contemplate that
plaintiff should prepare to build a subdivision before it
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acquired the financing to purchase the optioned property
and before it received a conveyance thereof.

It was simply

not foreseeable that the plaintiff would com?lete almost
all of its plans for a subdivision prior to exercising the
option and receiving a conveyance of the property.
Defendant submits, as is more fully discussed in
the following section, that the only proper measure of
damages for breach of an option is the difference between
the contract price and the market value of the optioned
property.

However, if this Court declines to adopt the

market value measure of damages, then defendant should
reimburse plaintiff for the $10,000 option price it paid,
along with certain limited additional expenditures.

As

the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Trayner established,
a reasonably prudent subdivider, following industry standards,
may have spent $500 for a preliminary engineering plat and
$100 to $400 for house plans purchased from a design firm,
and would have spent "a little time" in meeting with the
planning commission, various lenders and the FHA.

Defendant

concedes that the total reasonable value of these services
would be $2,000.

Clearly, only these expenditures, totalling

$12,000, are the natural, probable, and reasonable result of
defendant's breach.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

POINT II
THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AN
OPTION IS THE DIFFERENCE BET\'i'EEN THE MARKET VALUE
OF THE LAND AND THE OPTION PRICE TO BE PAID. NO
DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED FOR EXPENDITURES MADE.
"The measure of damages in a case of this
sort [breach of an option agreement] is
the difference between the value of the
property at the time the purchaser was to
have a conveyance of it, and the price
which he was then to pay.
[citations
omitted]
The plaintiff has the benefit of
this rule.
He was not entitled to show
loss of estimated profits or out of pocket
expenses.
Exceptional cases may arise
where departure from the usual rule is
permitted (see, e.g. Neal v. Jefferson,
212 Mass. 517, 523, 99 N.E. 334, 41
.L.R.A.N.S. 387), but this is not one of
them."
(Emphasis added).
Capaldi v. Burlwood Realty Corp., 350
Mass. 765, 214 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Mass. Sup.
Jud. Ct . 19 6 6 ) .
Accord, Cohen v. Lovitz, 255 F.Supp. 302 (Dist. Ct. D.C. 1966).
This is the same as the general measure of damages for
failure to convey a piece of property.
Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597

Bunnell v. Bills, 13

The Neal case referred W

(1962).

in the quote above involved the lease of a hotel coupled
with an option to purchase it.

It presented "unusual circurn-'

stances" because lost profits and reliance damages may be the
natural and probable result of the breach of a lease agreem~·1
Thus, the holding in Neal does not mean that lost profits and
out-of-pocket expenses are recoverable for breach of an option
agreement, but, rather, that where an agreement involves an
option plus an additional promise, additional measures of
damages may become relevant.
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1

Awarding the difference between the market value
and the option price would give plaintiff the benefit of
its bargain and would adequately compensate plaintiff
because it could then buy a comparable piece of property
upon which to construct a subdivision.

To hold otherwise

would mean that an optionor bears the risk of all preparations made by an optionee, even though such expenditures
may be completely within the discretion and contingent upon
the whims of the optionee.

See 17

~.L.R.2d,

supra at 1309.

While one optionee may make substantial discretionary
expenditures before the conveyance of the optioned property,
another may only want time to think about the deal, while
a third might make minor expenditures.

April 30, 1975, would

have been the earliest possible date for a conveyance of
part or all of the property by the defendant.

Prior to that

date, plaintiff was not entitled to a conveyance.

Thus, the

preparatory steps plaintiff took towards development of its
proposed subdivision were risks it knowingly assumed, because
the purpose of an option is to minimize the loss an optionee
suffers if he decides not to purchase the property, after
taking the steps he deems necessary.
Mr. Raymond Fletcher, a member of the American
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, at defendant's request,
appraised the optioned property as of April 1, 1975.
Tr., 2 at 114 & 116; 2d Tr. at 131-132).

(1st

After analyzing

comparable sales and market data, Mr. Fletcher testified that

-21-
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the 30 acres of optioned property would have a value of
$7, 350 an acre, or $220, 500 for the entire parcel.
2 at 119; 2d Tr. at 138).

(1st Tr.,

Using an income approach,

Mr. Fletcher also testified that the property had a value
of $7,347 per acre, or $220,420 for the entire parcel.
(1st Tr., 2 at 123; 2d Tr. at 137).

When this is compared

with the purchase price of $510,000, it is respectfully
submitted that plaintiff suffered no damage and that the
judgment below should be reversed.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MITIGATE ITS DAMAGES
~

A plaintiff has the duty to minimize his damages.
may not sit idly by.

A party injured by breach of contract

should do what reasonable care and business prudence require

to minimize his loss.

Salt Bowl co. v. Utah, 535 P.2d 1253

(Utah Sup. Ct. 1975); Enco, Inc. v. F.C. Russell Co., 210 Ore.
324, 311 P.2d 737 (1957).

A plaintiff cannot recover damages

flowing from consequences which he could reasonably have
avoided.

Chesapeake& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916);

Thompson v. Jacobsen, 23 Utah 2d 359, 463 P. 2d 801 (1970)

i

Jankele v. Texas co., 88 Utah 325, 54 P.2d 425 (1936).
It is submitted the evidence established, and reason·
able minds cannot differ, that the plaintiff completely fai~
in its duty to mitigate its damages.

On February 21, 1975,

a meeting was held between the principals of plaintiff and
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defendant.

(1st Tr., 2 at 91-93; 2d Tr. at 188).

At that

meeting, defendant presented several alternative proposals
to plaintiff in an attempt to convince plaintiff to take
a parcel of property that was more accessible at that time.
(1st Tr., 2 at 93; 2d Tr. at 190 & 192).

This meeting was

precipitated by defendant's concern over its ability to
bring a road and utilities to the edge of the optioned
property as required by paragraph 20 of the Option Agreement
in the event that plaintiff chose to exercise the option by
making installment payments.
42-44; 2d Tr. at 189-190).

(1st Tr., 2 at 92 and 1 at
At that time, defendant's

financial position was very weak with over $20,000,000 in
debts.

Defendant subsequently underwent reorganization.

(See 1st Tr., 1 at 43; 2d Tr. at 202

&

211).

The optioned property consisted of 30 acres at the
northerly edge of an area known as the Holliday Ranch.
plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

(See

Defendant first proposed an alterna-

tive to sell to plaintiff a 30-acre parcel of land in the
Holliday Ranch area which already had access to roads and
utilities, for $10,000 an acre or $300,000.
93-95; 2d Tr. at 192).

(1st Tr., 2 at

Defendant's second alternative was

to sell that 30 acres plus the riext 28 acres at $8,100 per
acre for a total price of $480,000.
2d Tr. at 192).

(1st Tr., 2 at 95-96;

Defendant also made a third proposal

to sell 15 acres on the east side of the proposed Holliday
Loop Road and 15 acres on the opposite side of that road.

-23-
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.,
(1st Tr., 2 at 96; 2d Tr. at 192).
tives were rejected by plaintiff.
&

All of these alterna(1st Tr., 2 at 98-99

102-103).
The main reason plaintiff decided not to accept aey

of the alternatives is that it would have to get the new
property rezoned, redesigned, reengineered and reapproved
by FHA.

(1st Tr., 3 at 14-16; 2d Tr. at 376-377).

However,

since plaintiff admitted that it would sell a prospective
purchaser a lot upon which he could build his own house,
it is respectfully submitted that this is no excuse for
plaintiff's failure to have mitigated its damages.
Plaintiff also felt that the alternative property
did not have as good a view as the optioned property, that
it was too close to a sewage treatment plant, and that it
had drainage problems.

(1st Tr. , 3 at 14) .

The drainage

problem was corrected by the subsequent purchaser for $750
(1st Tr., 2 at 143-144; 2d Tr. at 218).

an acre.

The

new developer had no problem in selling all of the homes
he developed, despite the sewage treatment plant.
3 at 5-8; 2d Tr. at 219-220).

(1st Tr.,

Apparently, since all of the

homes were sold, the view from the alternate property did
not differ appreciably from the optioned property.
Plaintiff sued defendant only for damages.

(See R.Hl

Plaintiff, as a land developer, was not agonizing at the
thought of losing real estate which would be impossible to
duplicate.

A substantial number of other tracts of land of
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comparable size and quality had been offered to plaintiff.
The remarkable thing about ~ost of these other tracts of land
was that the price at which defendant proposed to sell them to
plaintiff was substantially less than the $17,000 per acre
plaintiff agreed to pay for the optioned property.

Defendant

had charged plaintiff a higher price under the Option Agreement because of its duty to build a road out to the edge of
the optioned property.

(2d Tr. at 213-214, cf. 272-274).

Since plaintiff could easily have mitigated all of its
alleged damages, its failure to do so bars its right to
recovery, and the judgment below should be reversed.

POINT IV
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES ARE TOO INDETER..~INABLE
TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
Plaintiff sued for $65,500 in reliance damages.
(1st Tr., 2 at 1).

These damages included $17,500 claimed

for Mr. Fahs' "quarterbacking" services, and $22,750 for
Mr. Tuckett' s engineering services.

The first trial judge

ruled as a matter of law that these expenditures were not
recoverable "based upon the lack of evidence."
3 at 41).

(1st Tr.,

The second trial judge awarded only $15,000 in

damages for these services.

(Finding No. 13).

As to the

$27,587 which plaintiff expended, $5,000 of this was for
Mr· Tuckett' s

legal

"management" services, $2, 500 for Mr. Kesler' s

services,

services.

and another $5, 000 for Mr. Fahs' "engineering"

The defects in all of these claimed services were
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discussed in detail above.

Because of these defects,

defendant respectfully submits that plaintiff's damages
are too indeterminable to support an award of prejudgment
interest.
The law in this State on prejudgment interest has
been settled since the early case of Fell v. Union Pacifk
Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003 (1907).

In that case, this

Court stated:
"The true test to be applied as to whether
interest should be allowed before judgment
in a given case or not is, therefore, not
whether the damages are unliquidated or
otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages are complete and must be
ascertained as of a particular time and in
accordance with fixed rules of evidence and
known standards of value, which the court
or jury must follow in fixing the amount,
rather than be guided by their best judgment
in assessing the amount to be allowed for
past as well as for future injury, or for
elements that cannot be measured by any
fixed standards of value."
(Emphasis added).
Id., 88 P. at 1007.
Accord, Restatement of Contracts§ 337(a).

The policy

~hi~

this test is simply that, as a matter of fairness, a person
should not be liable for prejudgment interest when he does
not, or cannot with reasonable certainty, know the true amount
of the sum he owes.
In the instant case, plaintiff's damages are too
indeterminable to support an award of prejudgment interest
for the following reasons:
1.

Both lower courts substantially discounted the

amount claimed by plaintiff.
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2.

The evidence was disputed and plaintiff's

proof was uncertain.
3.

Concerning many of the items of

da~ages,

plaintiff

failed to establish any "fixed standards of value" or market
prices.
4.

No prior demand for prejudgment interest was

ever made by plaintiff, either in its complaint or in
either trial.
Plaintiff sued for $200,000 in damages.

(R.4).

In

the first trial, plaintiff was awarded $27,587 for expenditures
made and $16,000 for lost business profits.

(R. 92).

In the

second trial, defendant's motion to dismiss the claim for
lost business profits was granted.

(2d Tr. at 19).

Plaintiff

proceeded in its attempt to collect $65,500 by way of expenditures of money, time and services.

(See R.187).

In awarding

$42,587, the lower court discounted plaintiff's demand by
$22,913.
Defendant submits that the very nature of the two
awards given plaintiff through two different trials establishes just how indeterminable plaintiff's damages were.
The law is clear that prejudgment interest is not includable
where the damages cannot be ascertained until final judgment.
Rauser v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 437 F.2d 800 (7th Cir.
1971); Western Auto Supply co. v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d.36
(8th Cir. 1954); Portage Ind. Sch. Constr. Corp. v. Stackhouse
Co., 153 Ind. App. 366, 287 N.E.2d 564 (1972); ~United
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Pacific Ins. Co. v. Martin

&

Luther General Co:itractors, Inc

455 P.2d 664 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1969).

In Portage Ind. Sch.

I

"

Constr. Corp., supra, the Court stated:
"In this case the wide disparity between the
figure contained in the so-called invoice of
June 19, 1962, and the demand figure in the
Appellee's complaint and the actual figure
of the principal sum of the judgment would
certainly lead to the conclusion that this
is a case where damages could not and were
not ascertained until judgment.

* * *
'The test .
whether injury and consequent
damage was complete, must be ascertained as
of a particular time in accordance with fixed
rules of evidence and known standards of value,
which a Court or jury must follow in fixing the
amount, as distinguished from using one's best
judgment to assess the amount for past and
future injury or elements not measurable by
fixed standards of value. '"
Id., 287 N.E.2d at 569.
The leading case of Lineman v. Schmid, 32 Cal. 2d 204, 195 P.li
408 (1948), is in accord.

In Lineman, the California Supreme

Co_urt stated:
"[I]nterest is not allowable where the damages
depend upon no fixed standard and cannot be
made certain except by accord, verdict or
decree .

* * *
[I]nterest is not allowable when damages cannot be computed except on conflicting evidence,
such as in the present case, because of the
absence of established or reasonably ascertainable market prices or values.

* * *
The trial court's computation of the damages
was therefore not based on an established
market price, but on a value which it was
compelled to select from conflicting evidence
relating to the factors of cost, carrying
charges and profit .
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p

* * *
The judgment is modified by striking therefrom the allowance of interest
Id., 195 P.2d at 412-413.
Given the indeterminable nature of plaintiff's damages, and
the difficulty in their computation, defendant submits that
it should not be charged with prejudgment interest.

POINT V
COSTS
A.

No Witness Fees Are Allowable for the First Trial.
The allowance of costs is strictly statutory.

Mcintosh v. Crandall, 47Cal.App.2d 126, 117 P.2d 380 (1941).
Costs were not recoverable at common law, and any statute
relating to costs is to be strictly construed.

In the

absence of a statutory authorization, there can be no recovery
of costs.

Id.

Witness fees in civil cases may be taxed only as
provided in Utah Code Anno., § 21-5-8 (1953).

That statute

provides in relevant part:
"The fees of witnesses paid in civil
causes may be taxed as costs against the
losing party."
(Emphasis added).
Although the jury in the first trial rendered judgment against
defendant, that judgment was set aside and a new trial was
ordered.

Defendant, therefore, did not "lose" the first

trial, nor was it the "losing party."

When the proceedings

of a former trial have been vacated, the case must proceed
de ~-

Th

parties must be placed in the same position they_
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would have been in if no trial had been had.
"New Trial"

§

58 Am.Jur 2d
~

228.

The lower Court awarded $296.80 in costs for the
attendance of plaintiff's witnesses at the first trial.
(R.168

&

169).

It is respectfully submitted that this amount

must be deducted from any costs awarded plaintiff.
B.

Plaintiff's Principals Are Not Entitled to

Witn~.

Plaintiff seeks to recover witness fees paid to
Messrs. Fahs, Tuckett, and Kesler for their attendance during
the three days it took to conduct both the first and second
trials.

This is clearly inappropriate because these three

individuals were not attending merely as witnesses in behalf
of plaintiff,

bu~

rather, were attending to the conduct of

the suit as plaintiff's principal officers.

As stated by

this Court in Western Creamery Co. v. Malia, 89 Utah 422,
5 7 p • 2d 7 4 3 , 7 4 6

( 19 3 6) :

"One who attends court as the agent of a
party, necessarily attending to the conduct
of the suit, cannot be allowed witness'
fees, although he testifies .
"
At the first trial, these three witnesses all testifo
on the first day.

Mr. Kesler did not take the witness stand

again and Mr. Tuckett did so only briefly during the seco~
day when recalled by plaintiff's counsel.

Yet, plaintiff

seeks to recover witness fees for these individuals for all
three days of the first trial.

This Court should rule as a

matter of law that plaintiff's principals are not entitled to
witness fees on the days that they did not testify and,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-30-

therefore, that the amount of costs, if any, awarded for
the first trial should be reduced by $54.90.
In the second trial, Mr. Kesler was called out of
order on the second day of trial to testify and was· thereafter excused because he had to go out of town.
153).

(2d Tr. at

Mr. Tuckett testified on only the first day of trial.·

Yet, plaintiff seeks to recover witness fees for these
individuals for all three days of the second trial.

It is

respectfully submitted that the costs allowable for the
second trial must also be reduced by $54.90, said sum
representing witness fees awarded to plaintiff's principals
for days that they did not testify.
The total amount of costs which were thereby
improperly awarded to plaintiff for the first trial, and
as witness fees for its principals on days they did not
testify at the second trial, is $351.70.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted
that:
1.

The judgment below should be reversed and a new

judgment entered in defendant's favor, as a matter of law,
upon the grounds that the only proper measure of damages for
breach of an option agreement is the difference between the
option price and the market value of the property at the time
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of exercise of the option (and there is no suc:1 difference
in value in this instant case); or because ;:>l:.:.intiff failed
to mitigate its damages.
2.

Alternatively, the judgment below should be

reversed and a new judgment entered against defendant

int~

amount of $12,000, upon the ground that this a:-:tount, and only
this amount, represents those expenditures which were
reasonably incurred by plaintiff and which were foreseeable
at the time of making the Option Agreement.
3.

Alternatively, that the case be

re~anded

for a

new trial because of the insufficiency of the evidence, the
excessiveness of the verdict, or because of errors in law.

I

4.

That plaintiff is not entitled to any prejudgment

1

interest.
5.

That the total amount of any costs awardable

to plaintiff is $303.60.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of February, 191i.
PRINCE,

YEATES & GELDZAHLER

F. S. Prince, Jr.
Donald J. Winder

I

Attorneys for Defendant-Appell:'
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